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1. THE CASE FOR EMU lN EUROPE 
1.1. The vulnerabilily lo asymmelric shocks 
A small open economy lends lo lose less (gain more) than a larger c10sed 
economy by giving up ils monelary aulonomy and joining in a monelary 
union with ils Irading partners. Foreign exchange transaclion cosls and 
exchange rale uncerlainty lend lo alfecl rnainly small open econornies. 
This is because a relalively importanl fraction of their Irade is done with olher 
countries and Iherefore Ihey face large (and polentially unstable) foreign 
exchange markets. As lhe degree of openness increases, lhe benefits of 
adopling a common currency increase and the cosls of relinquishing conlrol 
over an autonomous exchange rate policy dirninish. This is beeause a 
devaluation has a rnuch stronger impacI on lhe price levei of a relatively open 
economy than on lhe price levei of a relatively c10sed economy. 
Regarding lhe sirnilarity of Irade and induslrial slruclures af each of the 
possible participanls and the EU, respectively, ii is to be expected that for 
the core eountries in Europe, Germany and its closest neighbours, shocks 
are nolably more symmelric than for the European Union as a whole. 
According lo 1992 dala on lhe correlation between average intra-EU 
exporls and exporls of each EU member lo olher EU members (see Gras 
and Vandille, 1995), the trade structures of Ireland, Denmark and Portu-
gal deviate moderately' and the trade structures of Finland and Greece 
deviate substantially from the EU average. But of course shocks affecting 
the monetary union rnay be symmetric, in which case there is no need for 
an autonomous exchange rate instrument. 
As poinled oul by Barry Eichengreen and Fabio Ghironi (1996), not only 
is Ihere no consensus on lhe empirical evidence on bolh lhe outpul cosls 
of surrendering monelary policy aulonomy and lhe efficiency gains of 
eliminating exehange rate uncertainty and transaction eosts (evidence on 
the stimulating effecls of a monelary union on economic growth is even 
weaker), but historie aI correlations between economic variables such as 
oulput and prices change wilh the process of rnonelary integralion. For 
1 ln the case Df Portugal, the specialisatioll pattem at first became even more pronounced (from 1986 
ui1til recently) but especially since 1995 it is becoming more similar to the European average. See 
Torres (1998d). 
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instance, while integration lnight incre ase the flexibility of the union it 
could a150 contribute to a reduction of the similarity af economic structures 
due to higher concentration of industrial activities. This concpntration of 
industrial activities wOllld in turn incre ase the lInion's vulnerability to 
asymmetric shocks. 
Hawever, as argued by Alessandra Casella (1993), these industrial regions 
do not coincide necessarily with politicaI jurisdictions: on the ane hand, 
they can be common to several cauntries and, on the other hand, they are 
in general much smaller than a country. ln that case, specialisation does 
nat lead to increased vulnerability af the llnian to asymmetric shocks. 
Besides, specialisation in Europe tends to take place within the same 
sectors (foreign direct investment in the wake of the internal market led 
to a convergence of production structures) at different price and quality 
ranges. Furthermore, it can ais o be argued that more economic integration 
will reduce rather than aggravate that vulnerability::. This is because, on 
the one hand, spending decisions in one country will be more direct1y fel! 
by the other lnembers Df the monetary lInion and, on the other hand, 
productivity shocks '\lvill be more rapidly transn1itted among members. 
As a consequence, bllsiness cycles \vill be more highly correlated and the 
potential need for unilateral policies such as exchange rate devaluations 
is reduced. 
ln any case, exchange rate flexibility can only have a transitory impact 
and hence doe::; not dispense \lvith the need for long-ruI1 real adjustment 
of a country's ecol1Olnic structure. Besides, nominal exchange rate 
devaluations are totally ineffective if they cannot affect thc relative price 
Df domestic and foreign goods (the real exchange rate, a relative price). 
Lalhlur lIIarkct flexibility mui fiscal tral/~fas 
111e labour market in the European Union is cha.racterised by high and 
persistent unemployment. After reaching record heights in 1994, the 
beginning of economic reco\'cry in 1995 brought about onlv a slight fali in 
unemployrnent rates and does not point to a return to the leveIs of 1990. 
The recent evolution of EU unemployment thus appears to confirm the 
2 Jeffrey Franke! and Andrew Rose (1996) look ilt data frum 20 indllstnilhsed c0untries irom 1959 to 
1993 ilnd condude that the greatcr IS the der;ree (lf intebriltion between collntries, the more h!ghl~' 
:-ynchrolllscd are their b"llsiness cyeles 
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view that the natural unelnployment rate a!ter each econonlic cycle 
relnains at a higher leveI, transforming cyclical unemployment into 
structural unemploynlent. Long-term unemployment, as the average 
length 01 lInemployment, is today significantly higher than in the 1970s. 
ln any case, these developments seenl to have tittle to do with external 
shocks or exchange rates3• 
ln the ElIropean Union, collective wage negotiations (emphasising job 
security), legal provisions and generous unemployment benefits led to 
wage rigidity (prices could not respond to demand changes) and higher 
unemployment, in particular of the young and less qualified. This situation 
contrasts with the US, where flows in and out of unemployment have 
been faster; the sarne is true for job creation by the private sector (in the 
EU public sector job creation has been very important)'. ln the absence Df 
collective wage negotiations in the US, larger wage flexibility meant that 
the faU in demand for less qualified work due to technical change in 
production teehnology translated in lower real wages rather than higher 
unenlployment. 
ln Europc wages respond quite rapidly to priee movements (there is little 
nominal inertia), although less so to lU1t:'mployment. ln Portugal dnd 
Sweden, and in Holland according to SOfile studies reported below, \Vilges 
are highly elastic with rcspect both to inflation and unemployment: the 
wage response - the scnli-elasticity - to unemployment is only slnallcl" 
than in Japan, in absolute values. Therefore, foregoing excl1i'mge ratc' 
autonOIny seems nut to be very costly. 
ln terms of flcxibility, what is then importallt for the Sll100th functioning 
of a European monetary union is thc capacity of real wages to adjust to 
asymmctric shocks. Labour mobility in Europc is low (although not lo\\'er 
than labour mobility within Inost EU-membcr countriesr bl1t, sincc one 
can expect that prices move faster than prodl1ction factors, that fact seems 
not to be crucial for the decision whether any EU country should partlcipate 
.~ A recent ~ttl(.l.\- b.\· Uamd (;ws (1997) confirms this \·ie\\'. 
-l AccordInf! tu lhe ElIropeiln Commission's 1':197 issue of ["JJloraJlJI) lI/ CU llldll"lnl. emplovml>nt 
growth li1 lhe EllWp('.m private sector O\'["r lhe P,lst 25 y,-",rs amounted to a ye(jrly ,1\'er"ge uI 0.:'\ 
per eent, compMed t,l 1.0 per eent ill Japilll <lnd 1.8 Fer cEnt in thl' USo 
5 Although lhe incffieiencics thi:Jt Me partly responsiblc for an unc!esirably lu\\" tabour ml1bilitv (apMt 
from cultural anei linguistic bMriers), SHeh 85 very distortt'd hOllsing markelS, sh,~1I1d bc elimm"tcd, 
cydiC<l1 migratinn ilo; <I meilns of offsetting asymmetric shocks in Europe is not" 5oci(\1l~' adeqllate 
sollltiOll even for cydicill unemployment 
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in EMU. This is true even if one rejects money neutrality and takes the 
view that discretionary exchange rate policy can affect output: real wage 
flexibility would provide for the necessary alternative adjustment 
mechanisrn. For the sarne leveI of econornic integration and regardless of 
the view on the efficacy of exchange rate adjustments (New Classical or 
Keynesian), a higher degree 01 real wage flexibility implies lower costs 01 
participation in EMU and less urgency lor other types of mechanisms 
(such as a lederal budget or emigration) to help smooth country 
idiosyncratic shocks. 
Inter-regional fiscal translers (a co-insurance lund) to ollset the lack 01 
labour mobility are not expected to be a characteristic 01 a fu ture monetary 
union in Europe: on the one hand, such a scheme requires deeper politicaI 
integration and, on the other hand, although such translers may be criticai 
in areas such as the US that are characterised by a high degree 01 labour 
mobility and therelore by a risk of depopulation 01 declining regions, this 
is not the case in Europe (see Blanchard and Katz, 1992, and Torres, 1996). 
Besides, these transfers lllay be use fuI to smooth adjustment in the 
occurrence of transitory shocks but they are not a substitute for real wage 
flexibility in the presence of permanent shocks. 
Cohesion eountries se em to have understood the importance of the 
economic and social cohesion principIe, enshrined in the Treaty, when 
compared with any other type of transitory transfers linked to the 
lunctioning 01 EMU. That expression 01 solidarity at the European levei, 
by requiring the setting-up of long-term priorities that go together with 
participation in the internal market (whieh imposes higher standards 011 
consume r protection and environmental quality) and with the ruIes af 
access to those funds, contributes to render enlployrnent creation 
sustainable and to avoid situations of high unemployrnent cum 
dependeney on continuous fiscal transfers sueh as the Mezzogiorno 
within Italy, Andalucia within Spain and the new Uinder within Germany. 
1.2. Adopting a credible monetary constitution 
Joining a monetary union that is based on institutions that deliver price 
stability is, as stressed by the modem politicai economy literature, probably 
the best way to implement a solid strategy of sustained economic 
development. The reason is that this option also precludes many of the 
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transition costs (the output losses Df a disinflation strategy) of such a 
regime change. Fixed exchange rates, unlike other policy targets, are 
easily observable by the private sector but also easily implemented by the 
authorities (see Torres, 1989). Also, as put by Rebelo (1997), making the 
costs of government activity nlore transparent to the public gives elected 
officials better incentives to focus on improving the productivity of the 
privale sector inslead of playing redistriblltion games. 
With irrevocably fixed exchange rates, the authorities raise lhe politicaI 
costs of inflation because their anti-inflation conunitment is constantly 
monilored by the private seclor and any differenl behaviour wOllld imply 
a loss of competitiveness for the tradables seclor. Accordingly, one could 
argue that, as a tendency, high inflation countries tend to gain more than 
low inflation countries by sharing their monetary autonomy in a common 
monetary institutiod'. Eliminating inflation in this way, abolishing different 
currencies, does away with the need to waste resources on hedging against 
exchange risks. A common monetary institution that delivers price stability 
is therefore a welfare improving lnechanism in a double sens€. 
This argument has been understood in aeadenlic eirdes but its importance 
has been disputcd ii not contested by Keynesian ecol1omists and others. 
They clairn that the exchange rate is still a very important adjustment 
mechanism not only in the case of unexpected asymmetric shocks but aiso 
in the face of foreseen developlnents such as world trade liberalisation 
and EU enlargement to Central European countries. It is argued that 
regions eharacterised by persistent differences in productivity growth or 
even by any other type of persistent differences as well as different 
structural characteristics of the econorny (non-wage labour costs, savings 
ratios, or demographic structures) should not form a monetary union. 
Although these are problems unrelated to the exchange rate regime', the 
"economic" discllssion arollnd EMU has been centred on these very 
issues, at least for the weaker currency countries. Real versus nominal 
convergence is in fact the rnost popular line of discussion amongst 
politicians and politicaI and economic commentators. Examples for most 
of the EU-countries can be faund in Buiter (1996) and Janes, Frieden and 
f, As inflation is rather low in most EU cCllllltries, 1 will not disclIss here the costs and bl'ndits oE a 
monetilry llnion Erom il public finance perspectiye Se€ Torres (1989) and (19%) for ii dlSCllssion of 
this iSSll('. 
7 As Willem Buiter (1996) ptlts it real cOllver,e;ence or divergenc€ has nothing to do with El\.'IU. 
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Torres (1998). Many althose paliticians and commentators find it politically 
interesting to oppose what they call grey teehnocracy and /or monetary 
fund an1entalism. 
The Toot of one of the 111ain n1islU1derstandings abollt the entire process of 
manetary unification is, in faet, that many people tend to see it as a 
teehnacratie obsession and/or an idealagieal defenee of lhe market. At lhe 
sarne time some af the farceful apponents of EMU happen to be technocrats 
(sometimes diplomats, central bank employees and even euroerats) ar 
ideological free-marketeers (as for example conservative eeonomic advisers 
and independent economists in lhe UK and in Gerrnany as well as in olher 
European countries). Instead, the idea of adopting a credible manetary 
constitution can be seen as a means of doing away with the primaey of 
monetary poliey over more important concerns of the society. 
ln fiscally-weak eountries and ín less developed democratic systems, 
EMU can be seen as a means of getting rid of national currencies and alI 
the econornic jargon that goes with thern, typically the excuses teehnocrats 
find to cling to power and iInplement ali kinds of mcrcantilist policies in 
the name of short-term real convergence. Most Df the time these policies 
iInply a sharp deterioratioll of social cohesion and quality of life, 
undermining long-term real convergence with the l1l0St developed regions 
af Europe. 
On the other hand, fE:'w people present EI'vlU as a desirablc politicaI 
reform instead of an external constraint. As a matter of fact, ll1any 
politicians and bureaucrêlts just refer to it as <1n unavoidable development'. 
Presented in this way, EMU can be easily blamed for all the policy errors 
rnade by national governments, monetary authorities and other national 
Dr European institutions. 
However, today rnost European govermnents (with a broad support in 
their respective parliaments concerning the goal of EMU) seen1 converted 
to adopting a credible and sound (counter-inflationary) rnonetary 
constitution'J. The probleln has been to motivate countries that alrcad)' 
Il Depending on lhe perspectiú:: lhe onl)" w"y pf tyillg Cermany into lhe FlIropean lInion, ,Khie\'ing mote 
politicaI integrillion and filSter enlargcmcll! to the FilS! tlr n1'lintélining ,lccess to lhe stnlchlTi1.1 íunds 
9 Unfortunately, some stil! see iI AS .ln unilvoÍlklble extern,11 conslr,lint lhA! goes logcthcr with ,111 
exogenous polítical objective to which theÍr pllliticillleaders h,lH' cl1l1verged. Ago()d eXilmple is the 
cross-party politicill Tesistanct.: lo lhe allthor's proposal tll enshrine in the Portllgllt'se conslitlllil'll, 
revi~ed last SllDUner, lhe objective af price stability in spite of a parli.lmentar~' resolll!ioll ilppnwcd 
by lhe two major politicai parties Íll favour of monetiUy llnion .lnd its objective:". 
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lla\'c crcdible monetary mstitut10ns - and therefore Cl low inflation rate -
to share their m.onetary autonollly with recently converted higher inflation 
countries that could resort to old (inflationary) habits. The reluctance of 
low inflation countries to team up with countries with no prior solid 
record on price and monetary stability stems from that possibility. This is 
why in Germany the BlIlldesbal1k has aIways cautioned against a fast 
embarklnent upon the European monetary integration project and the 
BUl1desvClfasSll11gsgcricltt made it possible, in its ruling of October 1993, for 
Germany to pull out 01 EMU should it not deliver monetary stability. 
Th" Maastricht approllch to EMU 
The gradualist approach to EMU was justilied by the need to set up 
common monetary institutions and achieve nominal convergence among 
participating countries. As the Werner plan 20 years earlier, this approach 
was a product of the French vision of money driving politics and economic 
fundamentaIs (see Torres and Giavazzi, 1993), but ended up serving as a 
n1eans for policy-makers, politicians and economists (as the Group aI 155 
in Gern1any), to express its reluctance concerning the Bundesbank's 
integration into less solid European n10netary institlltlonsl\l. The ide a trat 
the adoption Df a single cllrrency shollld be accomplished swiftly rather 
than gradually was ddended by 111any (including the French) but it could 
not work \vithout a clearer set of politicill rules, the monetary cOl1stitution 
of Europe, that vvollld ha\·e htld to be respected by aU members in arder 
to avoid bringing in insulvency problems. 
An ex-ante specification of the rules is not part of the TEU, however. The 
stability pact is an intergovernn1elltal solution to strengthen the 
enIorcement meChi.U1isn1 of the excessive deficit procedure. Alternative 
rules concerning the allocation of resources and voting mechanisms 
within the ECB, the re-design of the System of European Central Banks in 
an atten1pt to make it more stablc, and even the enforcement of a 
mechanism that would allow lor the removal 01 the ECB's board 01 
directors should it fail to maintain price stability are not defined either in 
the treaties nor at the intergovernrnentallevel. 
10 Bectll.!se of high llnemploymt'nt ilnd the difficulties ln re<\\:hing the Maastricht tMijet for the dl:.'ficit 
(with lower than expccted tilX re[clpts and hIgher outlil)'s). at least one dimension of the Gcrmiln 
politicaI debate in 1997 mimicked the debate dsewhere 
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Strict entry requirelnents and variable geometry became then the only 
possible approach to EMU that would safeguard Germany's position 
without fi nlajor refornl of the treaties. Paradoxically, this became early in 
the 1997 the main quandary in the procoss of Ellropean monetary 
integration since Gernlany too seemed to be in a difficult position to meet 
the Maastricht target for the deficit while Haly kept insisting that it wOllld 
meet the criteria set out in the TEU and would not cansider the possibility 
of delaying its entry in EMU's third phase beyond January 1999. H is now 
known that both Haly and Germany, as well as France and a11 the ather EU 
countries except Greece, met the Maastricht cri teria fi 1997. 
Variable geometry was initially understood as a care-periphery 
geagraphical divide, conceivably campatible with the notion5 af concentric 
cirdes an.d Europe ii la carte. Of course it was possible to define variable 
geometry in the sense that it meant a 50rt af open core that would allo"v 
fi group Df cOllntries to integrate further with respect to a comlnon leveI, 
say the internal market with some degree Df monetary co-ordination, 
based on the principIe of potential non-exdusion and requiring the 
llnanimous vote Df all countries regarding the conditions for opting-in 
and the possibility Df opting-out 11 • BlIt in the monetary domain to stay in 
the second her wouId have been perceived as a politicaI failure. 
Besides, in a multi-speed EMU, it wOllld have been more difficlIlt for the 
catching-up cOllntries to converge, in the sense that by being leH Ollt of 
EMU's third phase they could have become more vulnerable in the 
internationaI financial markets. As a result, by the simple fact of being 
perceived as laggards, these countries could have been subject to 
speculative attacks on their currencies that would have sent thenl further 
away from the Maastricht entry requirelnents. To complica te nlatters, the 
core lllembers, like the members of any dub, would have tended to 
beconle reluctant to allow for the fast entry of lnore members (see Alesina 
and Grilli, 1994, for a formal analysis of this point). Furthermore, they 
wOllld. have tended to maintain the club for other domains of integration. 
ln any case, if the 1999 deadline for the beginning of EMU's third phase 
were to be postponed, the result could be a serious set-back in both the 
11 lhe conc12pt af flexible integration, contained in the !\msterdilm Treaty, is applil:able lo olher 
domains of European integration. A similar notion - namcd positive \'ariílble geometry - was put 
forward by the author to the Committee on European Affair,; Df lhe Portuguese parliament in May 
1994 and adopted in a parliamentary rcsolution in Apri11995. Dewatripont et aI. (1995) describe it 
in more detail: it features a seI of mandatory competencies, lhe CClmmon ba.se, and allows for deeper 
forms of cooperation, open partnerships. 
NAÇÃO 
eDEFESA 
TIIC case for Ecollomic {md N[OIletary llllion: EI/rope and Portugal 
on-going process of monetary integration and the existing leveI of economic 
inlegration. lt can also be mainlained Ihal Ihere could be no inlernal 
market if there were serious currency misalignments that would give rise 
lo Ira de prolectionism. This is probably lhe mosl robusl politicaI economy 
argumenl for compleling lhe Iransition lo EMU wilhoul furlher ado. 
The argument is not trivial even for Gerrnany since it hinges exact1y on 
lhe idea of prolecting lhe inlernal markel from misalignmenls. This 
idea is furlher developed by Niels Thygesen (1996) who argues Ihal 
protectionist demands, arising from a fragmented currency system, 
would include industrial subsidies in the strong-currency countries. 
As iI is generally held Ihal lhe Deulsche mark may appreciale 
subslanlially in lhe case of non-EMU, lhe Euro may have, alter all, 
SOflle direct advantages for Germany. It is vital for the interests of 
Europe lo fasl accomplish EMU. 
Coordillatiol1 bdweell the "il1S" n/ui tlle "OlltS" 
Some counlries are nol able (Greece) while olhers are nol willing (Denmark, 
Sweden and lhe UK) lo move to the third phase of EMU by January 1999. 
Accepling a multi-speed EMU enlails the need lo co-ordinale monelary 
and fiscal policies between the initial group of insiders and the initial 
group of outsiders. To allow for some flexibility in such an open partnership 
as a monetary union amongst the core countries, .it is vital to better define 
and enforce the common base accepted by all EU-mernber countries. This 
is also the only way lo avoid lhe templation lo free ride, Ihrough lhe 
possibilily of opling oul, on lhe positive exlernalities crealed by lhe 
existence of a monetary union. 
The idea of crealing an ERM for laggards (expanded in many discussions 
on the relations between insiders and outsiders and agreed upon in 
Verona by lhe EU minislers of finance) could be, as argued in Torres 
(1996), replaced lo lhe advanlage Df all by lhe only available oplion for lhe 
outside countries, a unilateral peg to the Euro, which arnounts to the sarne 
as participation in the rnonetary union without voting powers until 
fulfilmenl of lhe conditions12. Unilaleral action, namely lhe adoplion Df 
12 eros (1996) uses that pllssibility ,15 a threat for misbehaviour illsiele EMU anel Giovannetti anel 
Marimon (1996) as a way of substituting the Maastricht entry requirements for better defined mies 
of the game 
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cuneney boards (that is, abiding by il strict non-steriIisation rule), makes 
sense because unlimited support Df sueh an ER1'v1 by the ECB would 
underrnine its very reputation fram the beginning; put differently, outsiders 
\vould be ldt 011 their OWI1. 
The emulation 01 the policies followed by the core would only makc 
sense, however, for outsiders that were able and willing to join EMU 
within a relatively shart period 01 time alter 1999. They could then adopt 
the European singlc currency without taking part in the fonnulation Df 
the common monetary policy. 
Outsiders unwilling to join EMU within a relatively short period 
of time and/ar likely to postpone that decision well beyond January 
1999 Dr unable to meet the criteria sct out in the TEU in the short-run 
(Greecc may well meet the criteria belore 2000) and/ ar sti11 not 
members (lf the EU (future EU-members) couId adopt inflation targets, 
as suggested in Dewatripont L'f nl., 1995, and in Pefsson and Tabellini, 
1996, for all EU nlembers; this seems to be the best available policy 
option in urder to do away \vith tht::' incentivE' to engage in compe-
titive devaluations and hdp higher-infJatioIl countries to build up 
an anti-inflation rcputation. SomE' outsiders (slIch as Swedcn and 
Denrnark) might cho05e not to adopt explicit inflation targets and 
lnight stay out of EMU for 111é1ny years or C\'E'n forC'ver. Neverthcless, 
they are cxpected to follow sOllnd fiscal policies in any case 50 that this 
option is (Hlly important for countries that want to satisfy the 
COll\·ergellcc criteria (amongst \.vhi(h thc inflation critcrion) in arder to 
join EMU. 
A principal F'" lhe ECB 
For EMU to work smoothly, politicai prcssure from the variolls intercst 
groups has to be directed away from the ECB and aimed at an institution 
that represents the European population. The ea5iest way to secure that 
goal while preserving the ECB's independence seems to be to vest the 
European Parliament (to which, among Dther Ellropean bodies, the ECE 
wOllId aIready report according to Article 109b DI the TEU) with the 
appropriate powers. This is because an inshtution that is representa tive of 
the European poplllation and attaches more weight to Iong-term objectives 
such as price stability, safeguarding the we11-being of a11 Europeans, can 
NAÇÃO 
·DEFESA 
Til" case for Ecollomic Illld Ivlollcf'tHY lJnioll: EIlJ"Ope tlllIÍ Portl/gal 
better flllfil the role of a principal on \vhose behalf the Ellropean Central 
Bank should conduct its policies!.'. 
It is crucial for the success of the entire European integration process to 
prevent the ECB and, for that matter, other EU institutions such as the 
European Conlmission, from being unaccountable. It does not nlake senSe 
to leave to a European central bank the task of circumscribing its own set 
af competencies. Therefore monetary reform has to be acconlpanied by 
institutional reform in the European Union with a view to more democracy 
(and thus accountability), more transparency, and more proximity to the 
Eurapean citizens. 
ln lact, lor the institlltions 01 lhe ElIropean Union to be credible and 
therefore efficient ln terms of attaining their objectives, they have to be 
accountable. Using the modern politicaI econo,my wording: we do 
already have the cOlnmitment technology to deal with the credibility 
constraints national and European policy-makers face, therefore wc 
should now a150 aim .:ü committing preferences to deal with the 
politicaI constraints í:1uthorities face and 'vvith the question af delega tion 
of powers1-l. ln game theory jargon: if institl1tions are nüt re-negotiating 
proof (if thcir boundaries arl;é> too informal) they are not credible; on thc 
other hand, if they are too dosely moniton,-'d they Jack a COlll111itmcnt 
technology. Therefore, there is <1n optimaJ leveI of 111onitoring i1nd 
enforcement. Putting it into comnl0n language: to achieve agreement 
on the design and establishment of Ja~ting institutions, they Il1l1st be 
accauntable. 
13 At prcscnt llnly lhe COll!1cil (lf Iv1imstt:rs comes dosp to th,ll rolfe, .\ cllllnlerv,~iling t'cnnomic (ollncil 
tn lhe ECB {<Js sll)!;gested (-',lfl~' thb y'CiH by I'reSlLlt'nt Chirilc ,lne! l"l\nleSled b~' F\!l's presicknt 
Duiscnbcrg (Ih<."n Gll\"l~rnllr (lt the Dutch l"enlrell bi1llkl. (llldct \o\"1;:,11<.l'11 ib \'ery .:redibditv, illl(\ldng 
fl\r interfeJ"cllce and prl'%ures tilat c,ln rnount ai Cln~' lIme 011(e eCOl1ll!IUC condJlil1lb detennrilk. It 
seems thilt, in spJtl' uf rCIU,wo=d dis(Ll~::,i(l!1 ('\"er surnmer ,lb,-.ut thlS subjc(\. the ISSUe h,l<: now 
disappeilred. 
J.l, Sec Torres (1992) for il dchnitwll llf credil:\llity "nd pCllItical constraints. Recclltly·. I disctlssed 
thcse questil1llS in a scminilf ii! lhe Uni\'ersiLhdc Católica on "crl'dibility \'ersus accountabiht~, 
in lhe proces:; of EllrOpe,ll1 mnllctary illt~'grilti()n" with JcEi Fflcden, whúm [ tlli1nk for calling 
my attcntion for the polttil.:al <:cit'l1cc liter,lture \ln lhe ,'gcncy rnodcl, and Jorge Br,'g<1 de 
f',:lilcedo, who ddcnds th.lt the :'tilbilitr pact is ii mei'lns of makil1g" macwecllnomic polic\' 
<1ccolmtable to future generati(ln~. 
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2. THE POLITlCAL DEBATE lN PORTUGAL 
Pushing for monetary reform 
ln 1989, the case for a European single currency was not perceived as a 
central question for Portugal. The idea of a monetary union in Europe was 
well received by the public in general as a long-term European goal 
although it was regarded with some scepticism with respect to Portugal's 
capacity to participate from the outset. The exchange rate crisis cum the 
European recession 011992/93 together with the adoption of a convergence 
programme designed to allow Portugal to participate in EMU brought the 
issue to the forefront of the politicaI debate. Attitudes towards a European 
currency have then changed with externaI economic conditions. Until 
very recently, there was a loud ideological opposition to EMU (and 
European integration) in spite Df a clear politicaI majority in favour. Most 
of this opposition disappeared when it became elear that Portugal would 
be able to join EMU from its very beginning. 
Unti11992, the ambiguous Portuguese response to the need for institutionaI 
reform and European integration was mirrored by complete discretion 
regarding the future course of exchange rate policy and the .timing of 
monetary refornl. On the other hand, capital controls, credit ceilings and 
administratively set interest rates (by then only partly dismantled) gave the 
monetary authorities the i1lusion that monetary autonomy could last forever. 
Throughout the 19805, the Portuguese govemment, although firmly 
cornrnitted to European integration, sided with Mrs Thatcher's government 
in its sceptical attitude towards rapid institutional reform, namely 
monetary reform, in the European Community. Only with the Country's 
first presidency of the Eurapean Council during the first semester of 1992 
the Portuguese governrnent's attitude towards the European integration 
process changed and the escudo joined the ERM: the initial sceptical view 
was abandoned and from siding with the United Kingdom Portugal 
turned versus the Franco-German axis. 
The policy of capital controls pursued until1992 had resulted in artificially 
high interest rates that were in tum responsible for a higher debt service 
of the treasury, significant lasses by the central bank, and substantial 
distortions in the functioning of the economy; they moreover implied a 
transfer of resources from the productive sector to the sheltered financial 
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sector. These transfers angered social partners and the opposition that, 
paradoxically, sided with the central bank and blamed participation in the 
ERM and what was ealled the obstinaey of the Governrnent with nOlninal 
eonvergence for the recession. 
The politicaI consensus needed to pursue the refonns was nearly broken, 
since the blarne for high interest rates was placed 011 exchi:mge rate policy 
(as a result there were constant calls for a devaluation of the escudo that 
grew with recession in the Portuguese traditional export markets, and in 
particular in sectors such as textiles and clothing) and on the convergence 
programme (responsible, according to that view, for the lower rate Df 
growth of the economy)". As in other liberalisation experiments, 
anti-reform interests (namely the banking system sheltered from external 
competition but also the traditional export sectors) tried to blame 
liberalisation for the international recession that was affecting the economy 
in order to resort to protectionism, allowing for specific rents (higher 
interest rates in the case Df the banking system) and/or enhancing their 
politicaI power (within the Government, the PSD and the Central Bank)"'-
It proved decisive, however, that full con vertibility and ERM membership 
of the eSClldo had taken ploce or had bem decided upon, in the case of the 
dismantling of controls, before the European recession and the exchange 
rate erisis. The period of exchange rate turbulence in the EMS, in spite pf 
its negative effects, provided clear relief to the Portuguese economyl;". 
During the sarne period, inflation carne down from 9.8 per cent in May 
1992 to 5.6 per cent in June 1993 and interest payments on the stock of 
outstanding debt, white rising in most EU countries, fell significantly in 
Portugap·'. During the crisis, Portugal was aIs o the only case in the EU 
vvhose foreign debt classification was upgraded. 
15 Textlie ilnd dothing (with pr<ldl1cti\·ity levds iii twn thirds and om' h"lf l"lf lhe PLJrtllgl.1eSf' 
mal1ufilcturing ,1Yerilge in 19R9) expcril'ncl'd iln initiill rilpid expans;ion with frec "ccess to lhe FC 
market bllt worlcl-~\'ide competitiotl, fragmenti1tion, lack of marketing ilnd higher domest".: lllterest 
rMes (duc to lhe policy l\f capiti11 ((]l1twl~ purstled in 19YO ~nd 1991) <l(celcrated th(\se calls 
lfi This WilS e\·en recognised by the then prime minister, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, who st,lted lha! some 
segments (lf lhe administrati()11 hild diffiellltics in digesting lhe new monetary regime (Sil\"il, 1994, p. 512) 
17 A manetilry polieI' of cilpital eontrol., designed Lo kccp dl\mcstie mterest filtes stable ilt n:,r~' high leveJs 
WilS stlbstituted for ii monetary poliey af Cilpitill mobility imd exchange rate stability (thE' escudo ln the 
ERl\.1) designed to keep domestic interest rilte-s ilt the (mueh kw .... er) intemationalle\·els although mm·e 
\"0latile (in the \·ery short-term) in the wake of speculiltive attilcks ogainst the escudo 
Ui lnterest payment~ on the debt fell fram R.r> per ccn! of cor in 'I1.j91 to 7.8 in 1992,6_8 in 1991, 4.S 
ln 1996 and 4.2 in 1997. Meanwhile, the official infliltion target, met in 1992 ond 199~, \vas met ilS 
well in the faur suhsequent I'ears. 
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The early 1990s proved also to be a most valuable learning pcriod for 
policy-makers, social partners and ecol1Olnic agents in general (sec Torres, 
1998c). It was possible for the private sector to learn more about the policy 
rule and eventually understand U, whde the various realignments were 
seen as a true escape clause beyond government control (to be triggered 
only in the case of asymmetric shocks). 
Those cirClunstances granted sonle breathing space to the real sector of 
the Portuguese economy while accomplishing the change in regiIne. It 
was the first time for many years (since 1891, when the Portuguese 
currency left the Gold Standard, with the exception 01 a period 01 less than 
three months in 1931, when it returned to gold convertibility) that Portu-
gal was living in a regime of lull convertibility 01 its currency. While it had 
been irnpossible to pursue structural reforms without the liberalisation of 
the econorny, it proved decisive to have had a clear economic and politicai 
strategy for achieving macroeconomic convergence before the European 
recession of 1992/93 and especially before the outbreak Df the ERM crisis 
(see Torres, 1995). The escudo managed to surviv€ the deepest post-war 
recession in Europe without leaving the ERNl and \vithout re50rting to 
capital controls at an:y tirne. 
Building up a cross-party consensus 
While the expencUtU1'e Df the state sector n:.'lTlilined on targl't in 1992 and 
1993, ta>.: re\'enue felI much below its predicted vJlue and social security 
expenditure exceedcd its target in 1993, indllcing a slippage in the process 
of fiscal consolidation. This interruption was mainly dlle to the recession 
(negative growth generated a lower total re\'enue that fell frOlll 34.1 to 
31.7 per cent of GDr and increased unemployn1cnt inducing higher social 
seclIrity transfers) and to the virtual collapse of the tax adrninistration. 
Despite this discontinuity the Portuguese public debt ratio as a percentage 
of the average EU debt ratio kept falling lrom 1993 through 1996, when 
it became less than 1. ln any event, the scale of the re\'eI1l1e slippage was 
totalIy unexpected and provoked a general sentiment of failure. The 
opposition to the strategy of macroeconan1ic convergence for participation 
in EMU and the debate on lhe costs and benefits of EMU became then 
centred on the is sue af real divergence. 
The maintenance of the objective of EMU participation during the recession 
of 1993/94 and throughoul the electoral year of 1995 was only possible 
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because of the steps taken before, i.e. joining the ERM and liberalising a11 
adrninistrative controis on capital flows. As the elections approached, the 
opposition Socialist party converged to the sarne objectives concerning 
Portugal's participation in EMU. And, as politicaI coIours changed, thc 
new Socialist-Ied rninority governrnent adopted the convergence 
programme of the previous executivc, initially with sorne "national 
reservations" in arder to ensure support from the right-wing 
anti-Maastricht party, the CDS-PP, and later, by May 1996, as a government 
commitment with the main opposition party, the PSD". ln Oetober 1996 it 
became evident that both the Government and the PSD were clearly in 
support Df satisfying as quickly as possible the macroeconomic convergence 
cri teria in order to participa te Irom the begilming in EMU"'. 
lhe budgets for 1997 and 1998 aimed at satisfying a11 the necessary 
requirements established in Maastricht21. They were approved in 
Parliament with the é1bstention of the PSD, since the two anti-EMU parties 
had indicated early on that they would vote against a budget geared 
towards Portugal's participation Ln EMU. Already in February 1997, the 
PS and thc PSD approved a parliamentary rE'solution in favoLlr of the 
Portugucse participation fro111 the beginning in thc Third Phase Df El\!lU. 
Calls for co-insurance funds and common employment policies 
ln Portugal there has been a consensus aml1ng the major politicaI forces~.2 
<1nd trade and busines5 groups about the goals of active participation in 
lq DAR n·· 75 - [S~ril'. 25/5/ Y6: QUE'stl0n time: ilnSlVlCr of tlw ~1il11stcr uf I'mance to the illlthor 
20 After st'\·er,l[ st,ltem\"nts of lhe Prime \linister f<:.'.1ffirming his Cllmmltment to th,l! objecttn', th\" 
COJl~l'Il.StlS (lJl lhe g()(11 {lf Portugill's partÍLip<ltilll1 in lhE" (ore grollp of ClI\lntries mo\"ing ,1he.1l"1 tu 
lhe lhird I'h,\;;e uf EMU was est,lblished 111 Pi1rlianwnt durillg the firs! deQ,1te of 19%/97 011 the 
sin,>;ll' çurren(~· ln O(!ober lYSl6 il s~'e(i,lJ (ongre,." nf tilc I'SO L"llnfirmed its support tor lhM 
objective. Both in the PS cll1d in the PSD, and I?Specia[Jy "utside pilrly cirdes, some sectors renl.1i1wd 
unsilllsfied with sll~·h " (on\"lO'rgen(e llf \·iel\"s 
11 According to the new conver:.:;-ellce prDgramme with revised Eurostat ciMa that lowered both the 
deficit and the debt tll cor riltios, the deficit to GDP ratio was sei to filll tu 2.9 per cent in 1997 anel 
2.5 per cent m 1 qy:.;. The public debt to COI' ratio was set to fali to ó4 per cent in 1997 anel to 62 per 
(e11! in 1998. lhese projecti(lns for 199:'1 alrl'ady ma!eriilli:o;eel in 1997 Inflatiol1 <'Ind long-term 
intere."t riltes wen: expected to satisfy lhe convergence reqllircments throughout the secoml héllf of 
1997 and 199~. lhe projectwns were (onfirmed ln April by the Europe<1n Commission (CEC 1997). 
22 pcr anel lhe CDS-PP ha\"e remained üpp~)sed to c111y externalliberalisation of the economy (mc! to 
Euwpean integration. illthou~h the lattcr seems to be maki.ng yet <'Illother complete lurnarmmd 
conccrning its stance on [LHope 
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the process af European integration and increased economic and social 
cohesion. This consensus translates into an active employment and social 
policy, in arder to avoid what may be called "dependent iederalism" (as 
in the ltalian Mezzogiorno or, within the country, with respect to any 
particular sector of the econorny or social group that comes to depend on 
fiscal transfers), and into parhcipation in the major institutional reforms 
of the European Cornrnunity, as a means of securing politicaI and 
macroeconomic stability while preserving Portugal's most self-praised 
"universal vocation". 
The objectives of inflation reduction and improved efficiency of labom, 
product and financial markets feature prominentJy in the adjustment 
effort, in line with the understanding that the most useful structural 
policy measures are those which reinforce the role af market mechanisms 
in resource allacahon. While this lInderstanding was stressed 1.n several 
Government documents - namely in the Portugllese contribution to the 
White paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment (Ministry of 
Finance, 1993) and in the 5trategic Options of the Governrnent for 1997 
(Ministry of Planning, 1996) - the politicaI debate neglected it lIntil very 
recent1y. 
That is why there were COl1stant calls from party cirdes and later 011 fram 
within the current Goven1n1ent for a1.1tomatic EU transfers (a safety net 
for EMU). When it became elear that it would be possible to iulfil the 
convergence criteria and that such claims vvould affect the very credibility 
of the Governrnent's cornmitment to EMU, the idea was $uddenly 
abandoned='-·'. The Governn1ent seems to have understood that those 
clairn~ would only aggravate displeasure of the net-contributor cauntries 
with cohesion and structural funds and, in this case too late, would imply 
the shifting of resources away from cohesion countries with relatively low 
unemployrnent, s1.1ch as Portugal, to countries with high unemployrnent, 
such as Spain. When the Portuguese authorities f1.1l1y understood that 
possibility they adopted the notion of "employability". Aiter German 
caIls, during the ECOFlN rneeting in September 1997, for an elimination 
of the Cohesion funds for countries participating in EMU, the Portuguese 
23 At the sarne time, early participation in EMU was .Jttilcked on the grounds lhat PClrtllgal ~hould 
participa te in an EMS It a kind of "oUve belt" monetary arrangcmcnt, \xith the other 5011thern 
Europeill1 countries. This positioll changed dramaticaU\" jll~t bcfore the ltalian Prime Minister 
Romano Prodi asked for ii slm-ver pace ln the transitiOll tn EMV. 
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Governrnent adopted (finally) a de ar policy stance tO\vards European 
funds and employment. 
Pub lic opinion 
The discussion about Portugal's participation in EMU has evolved 
significantly since the objective was put forward in the Delors plan. 
lnitially, the idea of a monetary union in Europe was well received by the 
public in general as a long-term European goal although it was regarded 
with some scepticism with respect to Portugal's capacity to participate. 
The case for a European single currency was not perceived to be a central 
question for Portugal. The Portuguese economy was seen by the 
Government, opposition and social partners as a catching-up and 
peripheral country that would still need a long transition period for 
monetary and financial liberalisatian and had to concentrate on coping 
with lhe more immediate challenge of the Internal Marke!. The Portuguese 
public opinion and polity became used to what was until then the norm, 
namely that Portugal was granted a transitional period. 
Against this background of relative indifference and the stubbornness of 
the authorities in not discussing the matter, the Parliament was, as in 
other instances of the process af European integration (such as the issl~e 
of the revision of the Maastricht treaty), at the forefront Df the discussion: 
in 1990 it organised an open debate on Portugal, the EMS and EMU that 
prompted politicai debate and forced the authorities to take a position on 
the matter", although politicai commitment to EMU was not on the 
agenda unti11992. Contrary to most other EU cmmtries (not to mention 
the special case of Finland described in Moses, 1997), lhe Portuguese 
Central Bank was never an enthusiast of ERM participation, free capital 
movements or European monetary integration; when refarms were 
accomplished ar decisions taken ... some times agaulst its preferences, it 
followed the new rules. 
With the European discussion about the ratification of the TEU, one 
renewed politicai party, the CDS-PP, adopted as its main politicai 
strategy an anti-Maastricht (anti-EMU) campaign. The exchange rate 
24 Sec proceedings of the Economic and Financial Parliamentary Committee hearing of April-J" 1990 
(CEF,1990) 
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crisis cum the European recession together with the adoption of a 
convergence programme designed to alIow Portugal to participa te in 
EMU brought the issue to the lorelront of the pllblic debate. At present, 
46 per cent of the population support lnonetary union, compared with an 
EU average of 47 per cent, and 30 per cent are against lnonetary unioll, 
cmnpared with an EU average of 40 per cent. Polls taken in December 
(Eurobarometer, 1997: 46) aIs o indicate that the percentage 01 Portllguese 
that think they have insufficient inforn1ation about the European currency 
remains lhe highes I in lhe EU. 
The policy debale 
The most popular argltlnent discussed amongst politicaI economists, 
"economic gurus" and politicaI commentators with no specific background 
has been that the exchange rate is still a very in1portant adjustment 
mechanism ln the face of permanent shocks such as world trade 
liberalisation and EU enlargement to Central European countries. [t has 
also been argued that regions characterised b~l persistent differences in 
productivity growth or even by any other type Df differences should not 
form a monetary union. Although these are probIems that ha\'~ nothing 
to do with the exchange rate regime, the entire "econ()lnic" discussion 
about the ql1estion of Portugal's participation ln EMU centred on these 
very issues. 
Of course, economists at thc Central Bank and at the Ministry Df Finance 
and academics with international experience, bl1t also the two main 
politicaI parties and a sITlalI part Df the business community, havc defended 
that, given the current macroeconon1ic discquilibria in Portugal, thc 
convergence criteria and the stability pact are important and instrulllen-
tal, independently of the TEU, to achieve sustained econon1ic grm.vth. 
Part of the bllsiness community, such as the Confederation of indllstry 
(CIP) and the Portugllcse banking association (traditionally more sceptical 
than its associales), the left wing Irade unians, lhe righl wing pp (unlil 
recently) and lhe left wing PCP, lhe technocral (Keynesian) and lhe 
so-called liberal, indeed conservative, wings of the PSD, the economic 
adviser 01 the Presidenl and many independenls close to lhe PS and/or 
influential in the media have depicted the convergence criteria as a 
problem lor real convergence. 
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Even the sectors more fd\'ourablc to Portugal's participation in EMU, 
such as the centre-Ieft UGT ,md the Portuguese industry association (AIP) 
have cautioned against the negative dfccts af EMU on unen1ployment 
and growth. But, besides the already mentioned arguments of persistent 
differences in productivity, EU enlargement and world trade liberalisation, 
no explanations were put forward to justify these presumptions. It seemed 
however that although people both could not explain why and how EMU 
would be a problem for Portugal and understood that exchange rate 
autonomy would not serve to resolve the structural problen1s that affect 
Portugal and Europe (on the contrary, it could only aggravate them), lhere 
was until very recently a generalised cancem that Portugal was nat up to 
lhe job, lhal sornehow lhings would go wrong. 
This mood seems to have improved with economic conditions, although 
polls are not yet conclusivc. ln any case, many still do not believe that the 
Portuguese economy could ever compete at any leveI within the Internal 
Markel, especially with the forthcoming enlargement of the EU to Central 
European countries and the libcralisation of world trade. The pessimist, 
and sceptical in general, warn against the social and politicalluuest that 
\vil! spread, fro111 countrics such as France, to the entirc of Europe:~. ln an)" 
case, apart from other "ide()logical" reservations, real versus nominal 
convergence remaincd the issue in the Portuguese public debate about 
EMU. 
At the sarne time, howen~r (mind the contradiction), I110St social parhlers 
(with the exception Df CGTP), politicai econonüsts (with the exccption Df 
some economic comnl€ntators, anti-EMU for ideological rcasons-"'-b) and 
public opinion at large have also cautioned against the possibility of being 
left out of EMU and the vveakening of Portugal's position in the EU as a 
whole. They have rcalised that there is no altcrnative and that it is better 
to be inside than "out in the cold". This is in fact the reasoning the 
Government used to overcome ideological reservations (Keynesian or 
others) to EMU w ithin the PS. 
2S S"ll1e commentatl'f5 h<'l\'''' been busy, SII1Cl' 1995, alllll1ul1Qng- tht:' end of th(' cntir.:' EMU prolcLt at 
occilsjons as differenl as Spallish iL'rry-drl\·ers :-;trike .... , 50ciilJ security rdorm pl,'ll1s lJ1 France. 
reports 011 Germ<1l1 ullcmplnyment "nd 0'0 011 
26 Anti·EMU positiOllS and ",'llli·[uropean Ideu!.'glb U ,,"Xlst Jl1 illl pllrty cirde:> and h,lH' gathered in 
m;m~· diffcrcnl /01"11, as for example, <'Iround lhe l'vh'iriLl S,'i"lreS (himself il pr<.l-~lIWpCal1 <'Iml ,I 
federillist) FOllndaticlIl where E1.lwpeilll and Norlh Americall right wing cnn:-;en'iltivcs ilnd trilditlonal 
Icftists share their distrust of the ctlfTlmt mtegr,ltilll1 processo 
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On the introduction of the Euro there has been much concern, voiced by 
the Portuguese banking association, over the issue of replacing all national 
currencies by one single European currency given the importance of 
cllrrency exchange trading in their activities and the financial set-up costs 
involved. ln a recent hearing in the parliamentary committee on European 
Aflairs, however, Iwo privale bankers when queslioned by lhe aulhor (see 
CAE, 1998, and Torres, 1998a) have walered down lhe imporlance of 
Ihese cosls. The public debale has now lurned lo Ihese questions. 
Variable geometry EMU 
The nolion of posilive variable geomelry has been accepted by lhe 
Porluguese parliamenl lha I adopled iI in a resolution on lhe principies for 
lhe revision of lhe Trealy 011 Eurapean Union (see CAE, 1994, and Torres, 
1995a and 1995b). As in olher domains of European inlegration, Porlugal 
would accept thal if unable to participale fram lhe beginning in EMU 
others could go ahead. It was feared, however, that, in practke, the first 
group of countries to take part in the Executive Board Df the European 
Central Bank would move forward in a11 other dOlllams of politicaI 
co-operalion, leaving the others eftectively oul of the politicaI core. On the 
other hand, ít was ais o feared that convergence would be nlore difficult 
for outsiders. That is why both the Govermnent and the mam opposition 
party starled to defend by the end of 1996, after many quarrels about the 
subject, that Portugal should participa te in EMU irrespective of any 
automatic transfers and of what would happen to other SOllthern countries, 
inc1uding Spain. 
ln facl, if Porlugal was to participale fram the slart in EMU while Spain 
was not, there should not be any significant costs even in the short run. 
Un1ike Ireland on Britam (see Kavanagh et aI., 1997), Portugal is much less 
dependenl on its bigger neighbour: Germany is by far the biggest clienl 
of Portuguese exporls (in 1996 even France ranked above Spain), although 
Spain has become lhe biggesl sllpplier of Portuguese imporls and compe-
tes direct1y wilh Portugal in Ihird markets. Besides, Spanish altitudes 
lowards EMU are ralher different Irom the UK's (even Ihough the Labour 
government seems lo have come a lot closer to them): if Spain was nol to 
participale from the oulset in EMU, it would most likely pursue a policy 
of exchange rate slability in order to join one ar Iwo years la ler. 
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Some (as the fornler Prime Minister Aníbal Cavaco Silva) argued that, 
politieaHy, it would have proven very diffieult to separate the two 
countries in the event that Portugal would perform only marginaHy betler 
in terms of the convergence criteria. But, one could have argued, as I 
argued in different fora, that, if EMU was to go ahead with the core group 
of countries, Ireland, Finland and Portugal - a11 with bigger neighbours 
that could either hesitate to participa te in EMU Dr faH short of fulfi11ing 
the convergence criteria - would provide a case in point for the fact that 
variable geometry was not an alibi for a European geographical divide. ln 
any case it is now certain lhat both Portugal and Spain meet the conditions 
for participation in EMU right from the start. 
3. IS PORTUGAL READY FOR EMU? 
Trade integration and similarity of economic structures 
From an economic viewpoint, the high degree of Portuguese trade 
integration with the EU points to high benefits and low costs of 
participation in EMU. Portugal':;:; trade integration with the European 
Union is well above the EU avcrage (80 per cent of total exports and 75 
per cent Df total imports in 1995 and in 1997). ln 1997, with respeet to 
Portuguese lllports, Spain has r€'l11ained (sine€' 1991) the most important 
sllpplier (with a share of abollt 30 per cent of total imports from the EU), 
fo11owed by Germany (21 per cent). France is Portugal's third most 
important supplier (with a share of about 15 per cent Df total imports from 
the EU). Regarding the most important markets for Portllguese exports, 
the situation inverts: Germany leads (with a share af about 27 per cent of 
Portuguese exports to the EU) and France and Spain fo11ow (with a share 
of about 18 per cent)". These three trading partners are foHowed by the 
Benelux countries, Haly and the UK. 
With respect to the likelihood of asymmetric shoeks affecting the future 
European nlonetary union, it is important to know how sinülar the trade 
and industrial structures of Portugal and the EU are. Aceording to data on 
the correlation between average intra-EU exports and exports of eaeh 
27 Data refer to the first ten months of 1997. Instituto Nilcional de Estatística, October 1997. 
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EU-member state to other EU members uI' to 1994 (see Gros and Vandille, 
1995), the trade structures of Ireland, Oenmark and Portugal deviated 
moderately, but not as much as the trade structures of Finland and Greece, 
from the EU average. 
ln fact, EC membership and hence better access to the internal market in 
1986 triggered an initial rapid expansion of the traditional Portuguese 
manufacturing sectors (textiles, clothing and shoe production) and brought 
about an increased specialisation of the economy. But increased world-wide 
competition, fragmentation, poor marketing and higher domestic interest 
rates (due to the policy of capital controls pursued in 1990 and 1991), on 
the one hand, and the modernisation of the economy and foreign direct 
investment (FOI) inflows, on lhe other hand, have since then modified 
that trend towards more similar econornic structures21'. 
Notably, exports from the Aulo Europa jaint venture, a FOI by Ford and 
Volkswagen with investment outlays equal to 2.9 per cent of GOP that 
began production of multi-purpose mini-vans at its new car plant in 
Palmela (greater Lisbon areal by mid-1995, are estimated to have reached 
almost 10 per cent of total merchandise exports in 1996 and 1997. This 
mvestn1ent has compensated the falI in employment in the textile, clothing 
and shoe-producing sectors (mostly based in the north of the Country), 
which have been experiencing job reductions that accom1ted fdr alrnost 
the entire employlnent reduction in 1995. This trend is likely to continue 
with the complete phasing out of the MFA agreement until 200S. 
ln addition, besides a precariolls agricultural and traditional speeialisation 
in lnanufacturing sectors sueh as textile and clothing, the Portuguese 
industrial structure has been highly fragmented (finns with fewer than 
500 people account for 79 per cent of total employment). Such a structure 
is good for competition (and for the flexibility of the economy) but bad 
from a resource allocation point of view. For instance, in 1992 half of the 
industry R&O was still concentrated in 5 large finns Ln the electronics, 
telecommunications and paper sectors (O ECO, 1996) and more than half 
geographically concentrated in Lisbon and the Tagus Valley. This 
concentration of domestic resources prevents a faster real convergence 
with the EU. On the other hand, most foreign direct investments that took 
28 The Internal Milrket scems nat to havl' incccilsed sector,ll spccialisation in ElIrope bUl, on lhe 
contrary, led to specialisiltion in different qUiI!ity Iprice ranges within lhe SilnlC sectors, ilS seems to 
be also lhe GlSe for Portugal ln the las I two to thn'e ye,us. 
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place belween 1989 and 1992 - afler liberalisation and belare lhe opening 
up of the Central and Eastern European countries - went to the tertiary 
sector (banking, insurance and business services) which experience a 
substantial lncrease ln productivity. 
ln shorl, lhe structure of lhe Porluguese economy slill deviales from lhe 
EU average. Although lhe specialisation paltem became initiaUy more 
pronounced, it seems now that the structure of the Portuguese economy 
is becoming more sinlilar to the European average, not in the last place 
because of foreign difect inveslment. StiU, differences in lhe industrial 
slruclure will persisl (changes in lhe induslrial slruclure lake lime) and 
wilh Ihem lhe possibilily of asymmelric shocks relahve to olher EU 
countries. However, exchange rate considerations seem irrelevant to 
lackle lhal problem bolh because of lhe high Porluguese wage f1exibilily 
and because of lhe permanenl nalure of lhe foreseen shocks (EU 
enlargement, liberalisation and globalisation). What is then important is 
to look at what are the institutional features that will constrain the 
capacity of response of the econOlny to 1110dernlsation and deeper European 
and world-wlde integration. 
Labour markel inslitulions: Porluguese de facto f1exibilily 
ln Portugal, the number of workers co\'ered by collective bargaining is 
around 70 per cent. There are two tmions: one socialist (the UGT) and the 
olher communisl (lhe CGTP). The leveI of bargaining is predominantly 
sectoral and there is limited co-ordination between bargaining units. 
Firm-Ievel bargaining is stiU very rare while national agreen1ents are 
atten1pted each year. Benefit entitlements before tax as a percentage of 
previous earnings before tax (the so-called gross unemployment benefit 
replacemenl rates) are ralher high for Porlugal: Ihey sland ai 65 per cenl 
during the first year and 39 to 43 (if there is a dependent spouse) per cent 
during lhe second and Ihird year (data refer lo 1995; see Marlin, 1996). 
Eligibilily cri leria for unemploymenl benefils are slriel: applicanls have 
lo have worked 1.5 years oul of lhe las I Iwo. There is a minimum wage 
(around PTE 60,000 in 1998). 
Wilhin Ihis instiluhonal selting and againsl lhe background of high 
persishng unemploymenl rales in lhe EU even during economic growlh 
phases (a problem Ihal manifesled itself especially in lhe 19805), ii is 
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noteworthy that the Portuguese experience contrasts with that of its 
Iberian neighbour, Spain. ln 1997, alter having peaked at 7.3 per cent in 
1995, the Portuguese yearly average unemployment rate was 6.8 per cento 
111is rate cOll1pares favourably with the other EU 111enlber states, in that 
only Luxembourg (3.6 per cent), the Netherlands (5.5 per cent), Oenmark 
(6.0 per cent) and Austria (4.4 per cent) reported lower rates in 1997. 
Whde Portugal and Spain had had a comparable leveI of unemployment 
at the end of the 705 (around 8 per cent, higher than an EC average Df 5 
per cent), in 1997 Spain reported an unemployment rate Df 21 per cenl. 
Both Portugal and Spain have experienced high budget deficits and 
indeed that fact has contributed, through high interest rates, to the rise Df 
structural unemployrnent; the sarne holds, to a lesser extent, for several 
olher factors such as unempIoyment benefits, institutional factors regarding 
the way unions work and the deterioratian af terrns af trade. But in 
contrast to alI other countries, specific effects (unobserved components) 
are responsible for 40 to 50 per cent of unemployment rates - negatively 
in the case of Portugal and positively in the case of Spain (see Scarpetta, 
1996). 
The large weight of the state sector in Portugal first ensured low 
unemployment in the 19805, albeit at the expense of raised econonlic costs 
in terms of high inflation, white wage increases were then tradeti for job 
security, keeping unemployment low. low unemploynler1t compensation 
benefits (practically inexistent until1977) also Lncreased the C05t Df being 
out 01 worFo. That mode!, as opposed to Spain's, led to both the lowest 
wages and the lowest strike rates in the EU. 
A possible explanation for the lact that Portuguese unemployment did 
not persist at ever higher leveIs alter the 19805 despi te struclural adjllstment 
but actually fell could be what Nancy Benneo (1994) called trading wage 
increases for job security, given that it was impossible to liberalise firing 
practices in Portugal. Still today, according to the OECO (1994), Portugal 
(although followed very closely by Spain, and mllch ahead of other 
countries) has the highest index of employment protection. But the fact 
that Portugal had low unempIoyment benelits and, in practice, a rather 
loose employment protection legisIation may have also led to a higher 
29 Thc <l\·erage rep!ilcemL'nt rabo af the UECD was 34 per cent I!l }995, 25 per (('nl III lhe rerind from 
1987 to 1991.7 per ccnt in lhe period fram 1979 to 19,';." anel J per cenl in the rerioa from 1973 to 
1977 (Blanch<Jrd and Jimcno, 1995). 
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responsiveness of wages ta unemploynlent3o . This may have in turn led to 
a less adverse effect of disinflation on enlployment and to less 
unenlployment persistence - the explanation stressed by Olivier 
Blanchard and Juan Jimeno (1995). 
Disinflation and structural adjustment in Spain took place truee years 
before the country's accession to the EC, just after the ail price increase 
and while the labour share still reflected lhe wage explosion of the 70s. It 
was of a labour-compensating nature: high wages with high 
unemployment. Portugal delayed its restructuring until there was an 
upswing: the oil price was falling, the labour share was already much 
smaller, privatisatian and flexibilization were becoming effective and 
transfers and investmenl associated with EC membership were gaining 
momentum, in tum opening up (the hope for) employment possibilities31 . 
The timing for stabilisation and structural adjuslment may also reflecl lhe 
fact that there has always been a consensus among political parties and 
social partners on the pursuit of an active employment policy to ensure 
social cohesion (although a large part af these programmes has been 
financed by the Community supporl frameworks). Two episodes during 
the recessions Df 1983/84 and 1993/94 illuslrale well this idea: in lhe face 
of a serious and widespread unemployment threat, the unions immediately 
accepted lower wage increases. ln 1983/84 rnany workers accepted.to 
work without being paid for several months in order to avoid being on the 
dole. This de facto flexibility of the labour market, in spite of its rigid 
regulation, shows that the Portuguese economy has some capacity to 
adjust to uneven shocks in a nlonetary union. 
Although it seems that there is no hysteresis in the Portuguese 
unemploynlent rate, one should not ignore possible labour mismatch 
problems (see OECD, 1996, for a description) which would indicate that 
the economy may have entered a more difficult period of employment 
adjustment. Vítor Gaspar and Silvia Luz (1997), following Blanchard and 
30 Small firms te!ld to circum\"ent re~t1I"tions by not p"ying social secmity contnbutions and by 
relying on short-tcrm contracts. Also, a signific"nt number of workcrs with permanent contri'cts 
haw been laid oH during lhe recession of 1993/94, suggesting that thcre is ii dr ,flIcto flexibility in 
the JabOl1r market (OECD, 1996) 
31 Sacrifice ratias (lhe number of percentagepoints between real productioll and equilibril1ffi production 
for each point less in the inflation rate) confirms thilt \'icw for lhe perlod 1980-94: !taly and Portugal 
have ratios of 0.65 and 0.66, respectively, white Treland and Spún have ratias of 1.0 and 1.47, 
respectiwly. Sec Barbosa and Machado (1996). 
NAÇÃO 
,~DEFESA 
Fnlllcisco Torres 
Katz (1997) and using quarterly data fr0111 1983 to 19LJ6 to arrive to a wage 
curve, conclude that there is real \vage flexibility even in periods of 10w 
inflation and exchange rate stability. 
Variations in the Portuguese lUlcmployment rate correlate \vith thc cyclical 
fluctuations of economic activity (OkLm's law). With higher unen1ployment 
in 1995 than in 1994, nominal wage growth in the Portuguese eCOl1OIny as 
a whole feU slightly (allhollgh less pronollncedly than in the previOlIS 
years). ln 1995 the flexibility of wages to labour market conditions was 
expressed in average wage rises of 4.4 per cent (based on the collective 
wage bargaining regulation), while real wages per worker are estin1ated 
to have risen by 1.4 per cent that year. This rise having been 100Ner than 
productivity gains, labour unit costs feU while firms' profit marginfi rose 
Iram 1994 to 1995. 
In Portugal wages are highly elastic with respect both to infIation and 
unen1ploylnent the wage response (tIle s€lni-elasticity) to unemployment 
is one of the largest al110ng European countries (onIy sl11aller than in 
Japan and Sweden, in absolute valuesr2. Real vvage flexibility is a slIbstitute 
for international labour nl0bility. Tberefore, foregoing exchange rate 
autol1omy seems not to be very costl~·. A de fncto flexibility of thc labour 
market, in spite of its rigid regulation, shows that the Portuguese economy 
has some capacity to adjust to lInC\'Cn ... hocks in a lllonetary unioll. 
Institutional requirements 
The new statutes of Banco de Portugal, approvl.'d only in October 1990, 
although the new law had been rcad)' for appro\'al ln Dccember 1989, 
gave the central bank a high degrcc of economic independence while 
maintaining an average degree of politicaI independence (increased to the 
US levei in 1995, see below), as compared with other OECD countries. See 
Torres (1998b) for a discllsslon on Portugal and Grilli, Masciandaro c1nd 
Tabellini (1991) for the criteria of politicaI and econOlnic independence. 
By 1995, the statutes of the central bank were arnended by Decree-Law 
l::! Sec. ,lmong (lthcr,;. OECD (lSl92) il.nd Luz ilnel PinhclTll (l994) A(úJrding to :;0me studies H'porteei 
il1 C;il.SpM <'Iml Luz (1997) il.bo in the Netherlands ~\-ilgC:; ilre highly e1astlC tCluncmploymcnt (-0.17). 
~jightly "blJ\'~, in ,'r-snlute terms. the \',,1111;' for pmtug.ll (-O 16) Increasing wi'lge bill differenti<lls 
(see OITO, 1996) <,Iso suggcst high nominal and real \-v,'ge ilexib1l1ty. ()n lhl' other hand, the rate 
of sLructuri11 unempll1yment has alnw"t not ch.lnged 5111ce lhe bt'ginning Df the 19~Os 
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235/95 prepared by the PSD government and presented for ratification in 
parliarnent by the PS after the October 1995 elections in the beginning of 
the new politicaI cyele. The enslling Law 3/96 of 5 February 1996 
established the maintenance of price stability as the prin1ary objective of 
the Central Bank, taking into accounl lhe general econornic policy of the 
Government. The Bank became the sole responsible for lhe conduct of 
rnonelary policy, having the obligation of co-operating with the 
Governrnent in the definition of the exchange rate policy and to irnplement 
it. The overdraft facility and direct pllrchases of Government were officially 
abolished. In the new law, and as in rnost European central banks, the 
Bank retained responsibilities for banking supervision; the Governor is 
also obliged to inform the Parliament abollt monetary policy rnatters 
following the publication of the Annual Report of the Bank. 
The rernaining legal inconsistencies with the TEU and central bank statute 
requirements (see CEC, 1996; EM!, 1996) were dealt with by the Decree-Law 
144/VIl, approved in Parliament in November 1997, and subseqllcntly 
tmnsposed into the Law 5/98 of 31 January 19983~. Moreover, the Portuguese 
Constitution, i.e. fanner Article 105, was revised, eIirninating inconsistencies 
with the TEU. Unfortunately, there was still cross-party politicaI resistance 
to the author's proposal to enshrine ln the constitution the objective of 
price stability (th€.' constitution refers to the statutes of the central bank) 
in spite of a recent parliamentary resolution approved in February by the 
two major politica I parties in favour of monetary union and its objectives~~. 
Structural funds 
The i.mplementation Df the European Single Market directives has greatly 
contributed to acceIerating the pace of other reforrns, as diverse as 
environmen tal quality and consumer protection. The total affiount Df EC 
transfers in 1996 and 1997 reached 4.3 per cent of GDP. Part of these 
:;3 The Governm of the Cenlr"l B"nk lhld discl1sSL'd.,,1 lhe parliamentary Stlbcllmmittee 011 Economic 
and Monet"r~' Union, ,lU thcse incünsistenocs and the necessM~' çlliIngc5 contained in the Oecree 
Law presented to Parliament by the Gm·ernment. The proceedings of those meeting,; ,md the feport 
on the Decree law, e](lb(l1"CI!ed by lhe author, can bc found in CAE (1998) 
34 There was even Cross-pilrty resist<1tlCe to lhe i1uthor's propasal lo revise Artide 105 of the 
Constitutioll. Bul fe<lrs lha! Porttlg<11 could be Idt ou! of EMU's third ph"sc dul' to ,1 plItenti,,] 
im:ol1sistency of lhe COl1ntry's fttnctament<ll la1-v with the TEU led to an exceptil1llal re-opening of 
Artide 105 already in the Sl'Cllnd reading of lhe reviSlOn process See Torres (1998bl 
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transfers, the structural funds (3.1 and 3.0 per cent of COP in 1996 and 
1997, respectively) and the cohesion fund (0.2 and 0.4 per cent of COP in 
1996 and 1997, respectively) have exerted pressure for internal reform-
given that they had to be matched by national public expenditure, they 
reqillred a definite establishment of long-terrn priorities in Portugal. It was 
possible to exert parliamentary pressure on the Covernment regarding 
the use of structural and cohesion funds, namely with respect to a better 
distribution of these funds in favour of the enviranment. Net transfers of 
the EU are of course much lower and, with the exception of 1995 (when 
they overtook private transfers), they are expected to fal! continuously, 
although Portugal should remain a net receiver until fuI! integration of 
new member States3". 
Estimates of the impact of the first Community Suppart Framework (CSF) 
of 1989/93, based on a general equilibrium model, point to an additional 
COP grawth of 0.4 pp in the short run and 0.5 pp in the long run. The 
official estimated impact of the second CSF, 1994/99, based on an 
input-output madel, is aIs o a 0.5 pp increase in the rate of growth](,. 
The CSF for 1994-99 aimed at reducing the main weaknesses of the 
Portuguese economy that regard: educatiol1, economic infrastructures, 
the productive structure (characterised by <ln excessive weight of 
low-productivity industrial sectors and a very low-prodactivity 
agricultural sector), social security, disadvantaged social groups, the 
environrnent and regional irnbalances. 
Privatisation and competition policy 
Portugal is amongst the largest "privatisers" of the OECO (O ECO, 1996): 
fram 1989 to 1995, more than 30 state-owned fimls were privatised, yielding 
a revenue equivalent to II per cent of COr. The biggest chunk of sales (about 
two thirds of total revenues) were in the banking and industry sectors that 
had been nationalised in 1975; in 1996 and 1997, the privatisation of the 
remaining shares in sorne banks and partial privatisation Df public 
35 This is beC<lUSC lhe bulk of EU expenditures is related to the Common Agricultural Policy. Given 
lhe structure of the agricultural sector, Portugal is reported 10 be a net conlriblltor to the EU in this 
sector. 
36 See Gaspar and Pereira (1995) for thl' general equiJibrium model and Ministry of Planning (1993) 
for lhe input-output modcl. 
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utilities (telecOllli11lmications and electricity), motorway operati..ng concessions, 
cements, and oU1ers amOlmted to 2.7 and 4.5 per cent of GOr, respectively. 
While regulatory reform in the financial sector already took pIace, it is still 
being implernented in the utilities sector. Public transport cOlnpanies, 
television, steel, and chemicals have not yet been restructured. TAP - Air 
Portugal, the nationaI carrier, features among the most heavily subsidised 
airlines in lhe EU, along with Air France and Olympic Airways from Greece. 
ln 1995 efforts to improve product market competition included: 
transcription of EU-directives concerning public procurement policies, 
financial contraI over public enterprises by the audit court, simplification 
of the notification procedures for foreign direct investment, more 
consumer-friendly credit regulations. ln 1996 and 1997 further measures 
were taken in arder to ameliorate public utilities' responsiveness to 
cansurners and to adopt more consurner-friendly insurance regulatians. 
But, as stressed in Barros and Mata (1996), while the legal provisions seem 
satisfactory they have not been properly enforced: there seems to be a 
generalised bias regarding the interpretatíon of the principIes (concerns 
with dornestic firms' competitiveness and ather businesses' rights 
don1inate over concerns vvith the consumers' surplus and social welfare) 
and decisions are 112ft to several non-independent sectoral supervision 
bodies and a competition authorüy that does not rank clearly above the 
fornler':;'. 
Exchange rate developments 
The escudo was forced to devalue several times since the beginning af the 
ERM crisis. ln November 1992, following the second realignment in the 
EMS and the devaluation 01 the Spanish peseta, in May 1993, lollowing 
only partially the third devaluation of the Spanish peseta, and in March 
1995, "following the decision to change the central rate of the peseta [by 
7 per cent], the Ministers and central bank Governors also agreed on a 
downward adjustment of the central rate of the Portuguese escudo by 3.5 
per cenl in line with the market rate prevailing since August 1993" (EMI, 
1996: 31). After this latter adjustment the escudo recovered to leveIs elose 
to those prevailing at the end of 1994. Because the financial markets had 
37 The first Competition law dates fram 1983 anel has been re\'ised in 1993 (Decree-Law 371/93), 
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been associating the escudo with the peseta, the authorities followed, 
since the beginnlng of the period of tunnoil, an intentional policy of 
de-linking the two currencies. 1hi5 poliey has been relatively successful 
(as can be seen by thc reduction of daily exchange rate volatility and of the 
need for official intervention ln the foreign exchange nlarkets). Interest 
rates on lO-year government bonds lell 300 basis points in the following 
12 months. 
ln nominal effective tenllS, the escudo behaved ln a rather stable way 
since it joined the ERM in April 1992. Over the last years, the behaviour 
of the escudo against a ba5ket comprising the currencies of 26 industrialised 
countries (BIS data) \Vas üne of the most stable of ali EU currencies. ln real 
effective terrns (using the CPI as a deflator), the Portuguese escudo was 
by far, fram joining the ERM until recently, the most stable cllrrency in the 
EU: its real effective exchange rate appredated hy les5 than 1 per cent 
untE the end 1996. Since 1987, it appreciated 27.2 per cent, more than any 
other EU currency. This is bccflllse from 1989 to 1991 there has been a 
substantial rise of unit [abOlir costs. ln i:1ny case, onl)' now the effects of 
exchange rate stability ar\:' b\:'cnming apparent as far as the redllction of 
capital costs is concerned, \-vhich in tllrn contriblltl' to the present econOlnic 
recovery (GOP is E'still1iJted to havC' gruwn nrollnd 3.5 per cent i~ 1997). 
Sustainability and conditions for fiscal consolidation 
Contrary to most EU (ollntril's, no special measlIres were taken in 
Portugal (011 the expenditllre side) to redllce the budget deficit to 2.5 per 
cent of COP in 1997. ln fact, go\"ermnent cllrrent spending depends 
basically 011 the Pllblic sector wage bill that gn.:.'\v more in 1997 than in 
most other EU countries. As in 199.5 and 1996, fiscal consolidation was 
achie\'ed largely' through higher tax receipts due to stronger economic 
growth and tougher tax enforcement. The Governlnent intended to tax 
both firms "nd the self-employed (declaring below-minimum-wage 
income5) on their imputed earnlngs before implementing a more 
comprehensive fiscal reformo The danger Df slippage comes in the short 
run from the possibility of deficient expenditure contraI. namely in regard 
to hea1th (that happened in 1997, a1though even higher tax receipts and 
both tax enforcement and lower than expected expenditures on social 
security, maintained the deficit ratio below the target). 
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Althollgh the leveI of pllblic debt continued to be excessive in 1997, 
arollnd 64 per cent 01 GDP, it is expected to laU below 60 per cenl by lhe 
end Df the century. Portugal is not making a big effort in order to redu ce 
the deficil and the debt: the general government primary balance reached 
a leveI of 4.2 per cent of GDP in 1992 but remained quite smaU thereafter 
amounting only lo 1.2 per cenl of GDP in 1996 and 1.8 per cenl of GDP in 
1997; conlrary lo whal happened in ali olhe r EU members, non-interest 
expendilures grew (more than in any olher EU cOllnlry) belween 1993 and 
1997 and Ihere was a dramatic fali in the implicit interest rates on public 
debl and indeed a reduction in inleresl paymenls from 1991 lo 1997. 
Nevertheless, concerning lhe suslainabilily of public debt, given lhe 
growth-adjusted effective interest rate and not taking into account any 
stock-flow adjustments, Portugal is in a situation similar to the Netherlands 
and Denmark and clearly betler than lhe European a"erage, with a lalling 
debt ratio and a positive primary gap. The JatteT is the difference between 
the actual primary balance and the debt-stabilising primary balance. The 
fulfilmenl 01 lhe debt criterion and indeed 01 the stability pact hinges then 
upon the capacity of increasing the primary surplus from 1998 onwards 
(already for 1998 the effort is not great: the budgeted primary surplus is 
only 0.9 per cent (lf COP). Cutting public current spcnding would increase 
confidence and reduce the growth-adjusted effective interest rate but 
pressure to increase taxes tends to h2lve the upposite eHect. 
ln addition, the speed of debt reduction wi1l be also determined by the 
receipts from privatisation and pcnsion expcnditurcs. Thcrc is still sonlC 
scope for future privatisation in 1998 and to a lesse r extent in 1999. But 
those receipts will contribute with only less than half of its total amount 
lo debt reduction (as a rule until 1992 Ihey contribuled wilh 80 per cent 
and much less 50 thereafter, reaching a peak of 77 per cent in 1996 and 
falling again to 63 per cent in 1997). ln lhe longer rLll1, fiscal suslainability 
depends on the capacity of restructuring the social security system whose 
deficit (2.6 per cent in 1994) would reach 8.5 per cent 01 GDP in 2035 if no 
measures wcre laken, according lo OECD sirnulations (OECD, 1996). 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although not alI future EMU members have similar economic structures, 
recent evidence suggests that more economic integration may actually 
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reduce rather than aggravate their ytilnerability to asymlnetric shocks. 
Business cyeles tend to be Inore highly correlated ln integrated countries 
in which case the potenhal need for unilateral policies such as exchange 
rate devaluations is reduced. ln any event, exchange rate flexibility ean 
only have a transitory impact on the economy and hence does not 
dispense with the need for long-run real adjustment of a country's 
economic structure. Besides, nominal exchange rate devaluations are 
totally ineffective if they cannot affect relative prices. 
Labour mobility in Europe is low but, since one can expect that prices 
move faster than production factors, that fact seems not to be crucial for 
the decision whether any EU country should participate in EMU. This is 
true even if one rejects rnoney neutrality and takes the view that 
discretionary exchange rate policy can aflect output. ln terms of flexibility, 
what is then important for the smooth functioning of a European monetary 
union is the capacity of real wages to adjust to asymmetric shocks. 
Since fiscal integration raises is sues of re-distribution, automatic fiscal 
transfers are regarded as inappropriate without an important leap forward 
in the pracess of European politicai integration. On the other hand, 
although such transfers mal' be criticaI in arei::1S sllch as the US that are 
characterised by a high degree of labour mobility and therefore by a risk 
of depopulation of declining regions, this is not the case in Europe. ln any 
case, cohesion countries seem to have understood the importance af the 
econom.ic and social cohesion principle, enshrined in the Treaty, when 
compared with any other type of transitory transfers linked to the 
functioning of EMU. 
Joining a monetary union that is based on instítutions that detiver price 
stability is, as stressed by the modem politicaI economy literature, probably 
the best way to implement a solid strategy of sustained economic 
development. This option precludes many of the transition costs (the 
output losses of a disinflation strategy) af sucli a regime change. Besides, 
eliminating inflation through the adoption of a single eurrency that 
delivers price stability does away with the need to waste resources on 
hedging against exchange risks, being therefore a welfare impraving 
mechanism in a double sense. 
The problems of persistent differences in productivity growth ar any 
other type of diflerences are unrelated to the exchange rate regime. Real 
versus nominal convergence becarne however the rnost popular line of 
discussion amongst politicians and EMU is seen as a technocratic obsession 
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and! ar an ideological delence 01 the market. This is the cause 01 one 01 the 
main misunderstandings about the entire process of rnonetary unification. 
ln laet some 01 the lorcelul opponents 01 EMU happen to be teehnoerats 
(and even euroerats) or ideological Iree-marketeers. Instead, EMU ean be 
seen as a rneans af getting rid of national currencies and alI the economic 
jargon that goes with them, typically the excuses technocrats and 
short-sighted politicians lind to cling to power and implement a11 kinds 
of mercantilist policies in the name of short-term real convergence. 
A postponed Third Phase (as proposed by the group 01 155 German 
economists) would not do way with any 01 those reservations. It could 
only constitute a serious set-back in both the on-going process 01 monetary 
integration and the existing leveI of economic integration. The internal 
market, based upon the principIe 01 a leveI playing-lield, is not compatible 
with serious currency misalignments that would give rise to trade 
protectionisrn. Were a country to credibly meet the convergence cri teria 
by joining EMU by 1999 (ii membership immediately redueed its debt 
burden and deficit due to a fall in interest rates to German leveIs), and to 
approve internally the refarms that lnake convergence sustainable, EMU 
should be completed without further ado. Italy may have been in this 
situation although it is now ready to join EMU Irom the start. 
The idea 01 ereating an ERM lor laggards agreed upon in Verona by the EU 
ministers 01 linanee could be, as argued in Torres (1996), replaced to the 
advantage af ali by the only available aption for the outside countries, a 
wülateral peg to the Euro. This is because outsiders wiU be left 011 their own 
in any case since the ECB could never intervene (and would not do 50 as 
several statements by central bank members have already made clear) in 
support 01 such an ERM without undemlining its reputation Irom the very 
inception 01 EMU. An emulation 01 the policies folIowed by the core would 
not lnake sense, however, for outsiders w1willing to join EMU. The sarne is 
true lor countries likely to postpone that decision well beyond January 1999, 
unable to meet the criteria set out in the TEU in the short rtm and! ar stil! not 
members 01 the EU, whieh could adopt inflation targets. 
Deepening the EUfopean Union sti11 depends on the realisation 01 a 
monetary union but EMU will only succeed with lurther politicaI 
integration. ln the long run, the ECB will only be credible if lu11y 
aceountable, as the Bundesbank in Germany and the Federal Reserve 
Bank in the US (which can be dissolved by a simple majority in Congress). 
To ensure the independence 01 monetary policy Irom the politicaI business 
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cyele while guaranteeing its proper accountability, the European Parliament 
ShOllld be granted the appropriate powers to lulfil the role of a principal 
for the ECB. 
It is not sufficient to make lhe ECB accollntable to the Pllblic opiníon, 
through peer pressure Df independent economists and/or statements 
made by the Council of Ministers and the Commission whose members 
already have the right to participate in its board meetings. Too informal 
an accountability does not guarantee lasting institutions, Moreover, public 
opinion is not an agency that could fulfil the role of a principal. Although 
EMU is already a mueh more demoeratie arrangement than other 
international experiences such as the Gold Standard both among 
participating countries and between institutions and individuaIs, namely 
at the intergovernrnentallevel throllgh the stability pact on fiscal policy, 
it is necessary to assure a proper delegation of powers to the ECB at the 
federal leveI. ln the cases 01 the Fed and the Bundesbank it is their 
autonomy that is informal not their accountability and both institutions 
are considered to be credible. 
Portugal should ôim at reducing the main weaknesses of its economy, 
lnaking good use of the available structural funds to modernise and 
restructure its economy, instead af delaying structural adjustment in the 
hope for n10re structural funds, a federal co-insurance fund or exchange 
rate adjustments. 
As in most other EU countries, the challenge Df EMU has worked as a 
mechanism for econonüc stabilisation and as a pre-condition for strudural 
reform and long-term development. It has created the necessary consensus 
to overcorne specific interests in the pursuit of sodal and economic welfare. 
The politicai consensus took long to build - much longer than in countries 
such as lreland 01' Spain - and it faced a strong and loud opposition - a 
time-lagged mimic of France's - but seems to be mature \Ivith respectnot onI!, 
to EMU but also to the wider goals Df European integration. 
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